imaginary family values presents
yesh omrim
a blog that reclines to the left
A song that could have been written for Judge Alito
2 November 2005
| Carol Rose Livingstone | Judge Samuel Alito |
|---|---|
| Denied a habeas petition for a convict sentenced to death. The convict argued that during the sentencing phase, his lawyers had not looked up his school, medical, court, and prison records, and therefore did not obtain evidence that might have mitigated his sentence. (Rompilla v. Horn, reversed by the Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote) |
| “Justice O’Connor has also suggested on more than one occasion that no undue burden was created by the statute upheld in H.L. v. Matheson, which required parental notice prior to any abortion on an unemancipated minor. Instead, she has stated that this statute merely inhibited abortions to ‘some degree.’ In dissent in Matheson, Justice Marshall argued that the statute would result in substantial interference with abortions sought by minors. He wrote that ‘the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support or actual obstruction of the abortion decision.’ These harms are almost identical to those that the majority in this case attributes to Section 3209 [the Pennsylvania law requiring a married woman seeking an abortion to notify her husband].” (Alito’s 3rd Circuit dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey [citations omitted, emphasis added]) |
| Argued that police officers could strip-search a ten-year-old girl and her mother during a drug bust, even though the officers’ search warrant, in the space for “[s]pecific description of premises and/or persons to be searched”, only mentioned the girl’s father and their residence. (Doe v. Groody [dissenting]) |
| “Section 3209 contains four significant exceptions. These exceptions apply if a woman certifies that she has not notified her husband because she believes that (1) he is not the father of the child, (2) he cannot be found after diligent effort, (3) the pregnancy is the result of a spousal sexual assault that has been reported to the authorities, or (4) she has reason to believe that notification is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon her…. Of the potentially affected women who could not invoke an exception, it seems safe to assume that some percentage, despite an initial inclination not to tell their husbands, would notify their husbands without suffering substantial ill effects.” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, op. cit.) |
| Ruled that state governments were not bound by the Family and Medical Leave act because Congress did not show “any finding concerning the existence, much less the prevalence, in public employment of personal sick leave practices that amounted to intentional gender discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For example, Congress did not find that public employers refused to permit as much sick leave as the FMLA mandates with the intent of disadvantaging employees of one gender…. Moreover, even if there were relevant findings or evidence, the FMLA provisions at issue here would not be congruent or proportional. Unlike the Equal Protection Clause, which the FMLA is said to enforce, the FMLA does much more than require nondiscriminatory sick leave practices; it creates a substantive entitlement to sick leave.” (Chittister v. Department of Community and Economic Development, effectively reversed by Nevada v. Hibbs) |
| “[T]he plaintiffs offered testimony that the exceptions in Section 3209 would not cover a case in which a woman did not want to notify her husband for fear that he would retaliate in some way other than the infliction of bodily injury upon her, such as by subjecting her to psychological abuse or abusing their children. The plaintiffs, however, do not appear to have offered any evidence showing how many (or indeed that any actual women) would be affected by this asserted imperfection in the statute…. The plaintiffs offered evidence that ‘mere notification of pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering’. This proof indicates when violence is likely to occur in an abusive marriage but provides no basis for determining how many women would be adversely affected by Section 3209.” (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, op. cit.) |
- Later: Teshuvah
- Earlier: Wanted: The Gerald Ford Amendment